000			03237nac a22003491u 4500
003			https://ark.frantiq.fr/ark:/26678/cci233943
090			_9233943 _a233943
101			_arus
100			_a20080911 2003 frey50
200			_aMethodological problems of the study of roman law _bEXT _eindividual and civil community _f[Dozhdev, D. V.]
210			_d2003
215			_ap. 91-111
300			_aršum ǎnglais
330			_aTo use the material of Roman law in historical science, one must have an adequate method of studying it in accordance with the nature of law. Formal nature of law implies a formal approach to legal norms and institutions. Interpreting an abstract legal form from the point of view of its contents results in distortion of historical reality. An example of such distortion is the well-known concept of the renowned Soviet classical scholar E.M. Shtaerman, who calls in question the existence of private property and the state in Republican Rome and under the Principate. According to her doctrine, all the land in Rome belonged first to terrirorial communities ("pagi") and later to the whole of the civil community ("civitas"). Elaborate law of estate ("iura in re") appears to be a system of surrogate forms ensuring private individuals' (Roman citizens') access to the means of production ; these forms were developped in order to make up for the deficiency of private property where public property was prevailing. Possession ("possessio"), usufruct ("ususfructus") and vectigal law ("ius vectigale") seem to be (in the light of this concept) forms of ownership similar to property and capable of substituting the construction of property. E.M. Shtaerman was wrong in ascribing excessive restrictions to the right of private property in Rome and in describing some institutions in the terms of "split property". A critical analysis of her concept reveals, together with misinterpretation of facts, two methodological defects. Firstly, formal reality is interpreted as substantial reality : forms of legal mediation between individuals and the means of production are seen as if they were real economic objects or acts. Secondly, the social nature of the law and social meaning of private legal forms are understood by the scholar as limitation of an individual freedom, i.e. as a historically attested submission of individual to the society. Consequently, legal unity of the society is regarded as public property and state forms appear to be communal ones...
461			_tVestnik Drevnej Istorii _v245 fasc. 2 _x0321-0391
610			_acivitas
610			_adroit romain
630			_a160
630			_a033
698			_426678/pcrtZTmusVUU24 _aAntiquit řomaine
699			_426678/pcrtgx5yOalcpT _adroit
699			_426678/pcrt2XKbjOmPcT _aloi
699			_426678/pcrtI6kvbZ3mIr _apagus
699			_426678/pcrtmIjssq03I2 _apossession
699			_426678/pcrtK7FPE26tGZ _ausufruit
699			_426678/pcrtuowQaT2IBK _aindividu
699			_426678/pcrtKPKSRRMdbB _acommunaut
699			_426678/pcrt5Vyzd3D9vw _asociť
699			_426678/pcrtgoo1JwfVWE _ahistoriographie soviťique
700			_91000126646 _aDozhdev _bD. V
801			_dCCI
831			_abesCHA _b230251 _c32274 _eCHA:Cr-Per 027-245